8187443: Forest Consolidation: Move files to unified layout

Reviewed-by: darcy, ihse

src/java.desktop/share/classes/java/awt/AWTPermission.java

@@ -0,0 +1,241 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1997, 2017, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
+ * DO NOT ALTER OR REMOVE COPYRIGHT NOTICES OR THIS FILE HEADER.
+ *
+ * This code is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 only, as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation.  Oracle designates this
+ * particular file as subject to the "Classpath" exception as provided
+ * by Oracle in the LICENSE file that accompanied this code.
+ *
+ * This code is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT
+ * ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or
+ * FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
+ * version 2 for more details (a copy is included in the LICENSE file that
+ * accompanied this code).
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License version
+ * 2 along with this work; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation,
+ * Inc., 51 Franklin St, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ *
+ * Please contact Oracle, 500 Oracle Parkway, Redwood Shores, CA 94065 USA
+ * or visit www.oracle.com if you need additional information or have any
+ * questions.
+ */
+
+package java.awt;
+
+import java.security.BasicPermission;
+
+/**
+ * This class is for AWT permissions.
+ * An {@code AWTPermission} contains a target name but
+ * no actions list; you either have the named permission
+ * or you don't.
+ *
+ * <P>
+ * The target name is the name of the AWT permission (see below). The naming
+ * convention follows the hierarchical property naming convention.
+ * Also, an asterisk could be used to represent all AWT permissions.
+ *
+ * <P>
+ * The following table lists all the possible {@code AWTPermission}
+ * target names, and for each provides a description of what the
+ * permission allows and a discussion of the risks of granting code
+ * the permission.
+ *
+ * <table class="striped">
+ * <caption>AWTPermission target names, descriptions, and associated risks
+ * </caption>
+ * <thead>
+ * <tr>
+ * <th>Permission Target Name</th>
+ * <th>What the Permission Allows</th>
+ * <th>Risks of Allowing this Permission</th>
+ * </tr>
+ * </thead>
+ * <tbody>
+ * <tr>
+ *   <td>accessClipboard</td>
+ *   <td>Posting and retrieval of information to and from the AWT clipboard</td>
+ *   <td>This would allow malfeasant code to share
+ * potentially sensitive or confidential information.</td>
+ * </tr>
+ *
+ * <tr>
+ *   <td>accessEventQueue</td>
+ *   <td>Access to the AWT event queue</td>
+ *   <td>After retrieving the AWT event queue,
+ * malicious code may peek at and even remove existing events
+ * from its event queue, as well as post bogus events which may purposefully
+ * cause the application or applet to misbehave in an insecure manner.</td>
+ * </tr>
+ *
+ * <tr>
+ *   <td>accessSystemTray</td>
+ *   <td>Access to the AWT SystemTray instance</td>
+ *   <td>This would allow malicious code to add tray icons to the system tray.
+ * First, such an icon may look like the icon of some known application
+ * (such as a firewall or anti-virus) and order a user to do something unsafe
+ * (with help of balloon messages). Second, the system tray may be glutted with
+ * tray icons so that no one could add a tray icon anymore.</td>
+ * </tr>
+ *
+ * <tr>
+ *   <td>createRobot</td>
+ *   <td>Create java.awt.Robot objects</td>
+ *   <td>The java.awt.Robot object allows code to generate native-level
+ * mouse and keyboard events as well as read the screen. It could allow
+ * malicious code to control the system, run other programs, read the
+ * display, and deny mouse and keyboard access to the user.</td>
+ * </tr>
+ *
+ * <tr>
+ *   <td>fullScreenExclusive</td>
+ *   <td>Enter full-screen exclusive mode</td>
+ *   <td>Entering full-screen exclusive mode allows direct access to
+ * low-level graphics card memory.  This could be used to spoof the
+ * system, since the program is in direct control of rendering. Depending on
+ * the implementation, the security warning may not be shown for the windows
+ * used to enter the full-screen exclusive mode (assuming that the {@code
+ * fullScreenExclusive} permission has been granted to this application). Note
+ * that this behavior does not mean that the {@code
+ * showWindowWithoutWarningBanner} permission will be automatically granted to
+ * the application which has the {@code fullScreenExclusive} permission:
+ * non-full-screen windows will continue to be shown with the security
+ * warning.</td>
+ * </tr>
+ *
+ * <tr>
+ *   <td>listenToAllAWTEvents</td>
+ *   <td>Listen to all AWT events, system-wide</td>
+ *   <td>After adding an AWT event listener,
+ * malicious code may scan all AWT events dispatched in the system,
+ * allowing it to read all user input (such as passwords).  Each
+ * AWT event listener is called from within the context of that
+ * event queue's EventDispatchThread, so if the accessEventQueue
+ * permission is also enabled, malicious code could modify the
+ * contents of AWT event queues system-wide, causing the application
+ * or applet to misbehave in an insecure manner.</td>
+ * </tr>
+ *
+ * <tr>
+ *   <td>readDisplayPixels</td>
+ *   <td>Readback of pixels from the display screen</td>
+ *   <td>Interfaces such as the java.awt.Composite interface or the
+ * java.awt.Robot class allow arbitrary code to examine pixels on the
+ * display enable malicious code to snoop on the activities of the user.</td>
+ * </tr>
+ *
+ * <tr>
+ *   <td>replaceKeyboardFocusManager</td>
+ *   <td>Sets the {@code KeyboardFocusManager} for
+ *       a particular thread.
+ *   <td>When {@code SecurityManager} is installed, the invoking
+ *       thread must be granted this permission in order to replace
+ *       the current {@code KeyboardFocusManager}.  If permission
+ *       is not granted, a {@code SecurityException} will be thrown.
+ * </tr>
+ *
+ * <tr>
+ *   <td>setAppletStub</td>
+ *   <td>Setting the stub which implements Applet container services</td>
+ *   <td>Malicious code could set an applet's stub and result in unexpected
+ * behavior or denial of service to an applet.</td>
+ * </tr>
+ *
+ * <tr>
+ *   <td>setWindowAlwaysOnTop</td>
+ *   <td>Setting always-on-top property of the window: {@link Window#setAlwaysOnTop}</td>
+ *   <td>The malicious window might make itself look and behave like a real full desktop, so that
+ * information entered by the unsuspecting user is captured and subsequently misused </td>
+ * </tr>
+ *
+ * <tr>
+ *   <td>showWindowWithoutWarningBanner</td>
+ *   <td>Display of a window without also displaying a banner warning
+ * that the window was created by an applet</td>
+ *   <td>Without this warning,
+ * an applet may pop up windows without the user knowing that they
+ * belong to an applet.  Since users may make security-sensitive
+ * decisions based on whether or not the window belongs to an applet
+ * (entering a username and password into a dialog box, for example),
+ * disabling this warning banner may allow applets to trick the user
+ * into entering such information.</td>
+ * </tr>
+ *
+ * <tr>
+ *   <td>toolkitModality</td>
+ *   <td>Creating {@link Dialog.ModalityType#TOOLKIT_MODAL TOOLKIT_MODAL} dialogs
+ *       and setting the {@link Dialog.ModalExclusionType#TOOLKIT_EXCLUDE
+ *       TOOLKIT_EXCLUDE} window property.</td>
+ *   <td>When a toolkit-modal dialog is shown from an applet, it blocks all other
+ * applets in the browser. When launching applications from Java Web Start,
+ * its windows (such as the security dialog) may also be blocked by toolkit-modal
+ * dialogs, shown from these applications.</td>
+ * </tr>
+ *
+ * <tr>
+ *   <td>watchMousePointer</td>
+ *   <td>Getting the information about the mouse pointer position at any
+ * time</td>
+ *   <td>Constantly watching the mouse pointer,
+ * an applet can make guesses about what the user is doing, i.e. moving
+ * the mouse to the lower left corner of the screen most likely means that
+ * the user is about to launch an application. If a virtual keypad is used
+ * so that keyboard is emulated using the mouse, an applet may guess what
+ * is being typed.</td>
+ * </tr>
+ * </tbody>
+ * </table>
+ *
+ * @see java.security.BasicPermission
+ * @see java.security.Permission
+ * @see java.security.Permissions
+ * @see java.security.PermissionCollection
+ * @see java.lang.SecurityManager
+ *
+ *
+ * @author Marianne Mueller
+ * @author Roland Schemers
+ */
+
+public final class AWTPermission extends BasicPermission {
+
+    /** use serialVersionUID from the Java 2 platform for interoperability */
+    private static final long serialVersionUID = 8890392402588814465L;
+
+    /**
+     * Creates a new {@code AWTPermission} with the specified name.
+     * The name is the symbolic name of the {@code AWTPermission},
+     * such as "topLevelWindow", "systemClipboard", etc. An asterisk
+     * may be used to indicate all AWT permissions.
+     *
+     * @param name the name of the AWTPermission
+     *
+     * @throws NullPointerException if {@code name} is {@code null}.
+     * @throws IllegalArgumentException if {@code name} is empty.
+     */
+
+    public AWTPermission(String name)
+    {
+        super(name);
+    }
+
+    /**
+     * Creates a new {@code AWTPermission} object with the specified name.
+     * The name is the symbolic name of the {@code AWTPermission}, and the
+     * actions string is currently unused and should be {@code null}.
+     *
+     * @param name the name of the {@code AWTPermission}
+     * @param actions should be {@code null}
+     *
+     * @throws NullPointerException if {@code name} is {@code null}.
+     * @throws IllegalArgumentException if {@code name} is empty.
+     */
+
+    public AWTPermission(String name, String actions)
+    {
+        super(name, actions);
+    }
+}