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8184219: Fix accessibility of tables in the java.desktop module
Reviewed-by: jjg
This commit is contained in:
Sergey Bylokhov
parent
5852f663bf
commit
49c29ca974
39 changed files with 1597 additions and 1554 deletions
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@ -48,144 +48,116 @@ import java.security.BasicPermission;
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* <caption>AWTPermission target names, descriptions, and associated risks
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* </caption>
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* <thead>
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* <tr>
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* <th>Permission Target Name</th>
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* <th>What the Permission Allows</th>
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* <th>Risks of Allowing this Permission</th>
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* </tr>
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* <tr>
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* <th scope="col">Permission Target Name
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* <th scope="col">What the Permission Allows
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* <th scope="col">Risks of Allowing this Permission
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* </thead>
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* <tbody>
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* <tr>
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* <td>accessClipboard</td>
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* <td>Posting and retrieval of information to and from the AWT clipboard</td>
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* <td>This would allow malfeasant code to share
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* potentially sensitive or confidential information.</td>
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* </tr>
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*
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* <tr>
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* <td>accessEventQueue</td>
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* <td>Access to the AWT event queue</td>
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* <td>After retrieving the AWT event queue,
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* malicious code may peek at and even remove existing events
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* from its event queue, as well as post bogus events which may purposefully
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* cause the application or applet to misbehave in an insecure manner.</td>
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* </tr>
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*
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* <tr>
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* <td>accessSystemTray</td>
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* <td>Access to the AWT SystemTray instance</td>
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* <td>This would allow malicious code to add tray icons to the system tray.
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* First, such an icon may look like the icon of some known application
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* (such as a firewall or anti-virus) and order a user to do something unsafe
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* (with help of balloon messages). Second, the system tray may be glutted with
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* tray icons so that no one could add a tray icon anymore.</td>
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* </tr>
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*
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* <tr>
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* <td>createRobot</td>
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* <td>Create java.awt.Robot objects</td>
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* <td>The java.awt.Robot object allows code to generate native-level
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* mouse and keyboard events as well as read the screen. It could allow
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* malicious code to control the system, run other programs, read the
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* display, and deny mouse and keyboard access to the user.</td>
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* </tr>
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*
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* <tr>
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* <td>fullScreenExclusive</td>
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* <td>Enter full-screen exclusive mode</td>
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* <td>Entering full-screen exclusive mode allows direct access to
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* low-level graphics card memory. This could be used to spoof the
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* system, since the program is in direct control of rendering. Depending on
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* the implementation, the security warning may not be shown for the windows
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* used to enter the full-screen exclusive mode (assuming that the {@code
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* fullScreenExclusive} permission has been granted to this application). Note
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* that this behavior does not mean that the {@code
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* showWindowWithoutWarningBanner} permission will be automatically granted to
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* the application which has the {@code fullScreenExclusive} permission:
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* non-full-screen windows will continue to be shown with the security
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* warning.</td>
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* </tr>
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*
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* <tr>
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* <td>listenToAllAWTEvents</td>
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* <td>Listen to all AWT events, system-wide</td>
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* <td>After adding an AWT event listener,
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* malicious code may scan all AWT events dispatched in the system,
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* allowing it to read all user input (such as passwords). Each
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* AWT event listener is called from within the context of that
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* event queue's EventDispatchThread, so if the accessEventQueue
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* permission is also enabled, malicious code could modify the
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* contents of AWT event queues system-wide, causing the application
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* or applet to misbehave in an insecure manner.</td>
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* </tr>
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*
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* <tr>
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* <td>readDisplayPixels</td>
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* <td>Readback of pixels from the display screen</td>
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* <td>Interfaces such as the java.awt.Composite interface or the
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* java.awt.Robot class allow arbitrary code to examine pixels on the
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* display enable malicious code to snoop on the activities of the user.</td>
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* </tr>
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*
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* <tr>
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* <td>replaceKeyboardFocusManager</td>
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* <td>Sets the {@code KeyboardFocusManager} for
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* a particular thread.
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* <td>When {@code SecurityManager} is installed, the invoking
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* thread must be granted this permission in order to replace
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* the current {@code KeyboardFocusManager}. If permission
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* is not granted, a {@code SecurityException} will be thrown.
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* </tr>
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*
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* <tr>
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* <td>setAppletStub</td>
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* <td>Setting the stub which implements Applet container services</td>
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* <td>Malicious code could set an applet's stub and result in unexpected
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* behavior or denial of service to an applet.</td>
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* </tr>
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*
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* <tr>
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* <td>setWindowAlwaysOnTop</td>
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* <td>Setting always-on-top property of the window: {@link Window#setAlwaysOnTop}</td>
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* <td>The malicious window might make itself look and behave like a real full desktop, so that
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* information entered by the unsuspecting user is captured and subsequently misused </td>
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* </tr>
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*
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* <tr>
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* <td>showWindowWithoutWarningBanner</td>
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* <td>Display of a window without also displaying a banner warning
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* that the window was created by an applet</td>
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* <td>Without this warning,
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* an applet may pop up windows without the user knowing that they
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* belong to an applet. Since users may make security-sensitive
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* decisions based on whether or not the window belongs to an applet
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* (entering a username and password into a dialog box, for example),
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* disabling this warning banner may allow applets to trick the user
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* into entering such information.</td>
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* </tr>
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*
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* <tr>
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* <td>toolkitModality</td>
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* <td>Creating {@link Dialog.ModalityType#TOOLKIT_MODAL TOOLKIT_MODAL} dialogs
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* and setting the {@link Dialog.ModalExclusionType#TOOLKIT_EXCLUDE
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* TOOLKIT_EXCLUDE} window property.</td>
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* <td>When a toolkit-modal dialog is shown from an applet, it blocks all other
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* applets in the browser. When launching applications from Java Web Start,
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* its windows (such as the security dialog) may also be blocked by toolkit-modal
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* dialogs, shown from these applications.</td>
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* </tr>
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*
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* <tr>
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* <td>watchMousePointer</td>
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* <td>Getting the information about the mouse pointer position at any
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* time</td>
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* <td>Constantly watching the mouse pointer,
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* an applet can make guesses about what the user is doing, i.e. moving
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* the mouse to the lower left corner of the screen most likely means that
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* the user is about to launch an application. If a virtual keypad is used
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* so that keyboard is emulated using the mouse, an applet may guess what
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* is being typed.</td>
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* </tr>
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* <tr>
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* <th scope="row">accessClipboard
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* <td>Posting and retrieval of information to and from the AWT clipboard
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* <td>This would allow malfeasant code to share potentially sensitive or
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* confidential information.
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* <tr>
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* <th scope="row">accessEventQueue
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* <td>Access to the AWT event queue
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* <td>After retrieving the AWT event queue, malicious code may peek at and
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* even remove existing events from its event queue, as well as post bogus
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* events which may purposefully cause the application or applet to
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* misbehave in an insecure manner.
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* <tr>
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* <th scope="row">accessSystemTray
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* <td>Access to the AWT SystemTray instance
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* <td>This would allow malicious code to add tray icons to the system tray.
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* First, such an icon may look like the icon of some known application
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* (such as a firewall or anti-virus) and order a user to do something
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* unsafe (with help of balloon messages). Second, the system tray may be
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* glutted with tray icons so that no one could add a tray icon anymore.
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* <tr>
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* <th scope="row">createRobot
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* <td>Create java.awt.Robot objects
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* <td>The java.awt.Robot object allows code to generate native-level mouse
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* and keyboard events as well as read the screen. It could allow malicious
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* code to control the system, run other programs, read the display, and
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* deny mouse and keyboard access to the user.
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* <tr>
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* <th scope="row">fullScreenExclusive
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* <td>Enter full-screen exclusive mode
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* <td>Entering full-screen exclusive mode allows direct access to low-level
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* graphics card memory. This could be used to spoof the system, since the
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* program is in direct control of rendering. Depending on the
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* implementation, the security warning may not be shown for the windows
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* used to enter the full-screen exclusive mode (assuming that the
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* {@code fullScreenExclusive} permission has been granted to this
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* application). Note that this behavior does not mean that the
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* {@code showWindowWithoutWarningBanner} permission will be automatically
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* granted to the application which has the {@code fullScreenExclusive}
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* permission: non-full-screen windows will continue to be shown with the
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* security warning.
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* <tr>
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* <th scope="row">listenToAllAWTEvents
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* <td>Listen to all AWT events, system-wide
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* <td>After adding an AWT event listener, malicious code may scan all AWT
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* events dispatched in the system, allowing it to read all user input (such
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* as passwords). Each AWT event listener is called from within the context
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* of that event queue's EventDispatchThread, so if the accessEventQueue
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* permission is also enabled, malicious code could modify the contents of
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* AWT event queues system-wide, causing the application or applet to
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* misbehave in an insecure manner.
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* <tr>
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* <th scope="row">readDisplayPixels
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* <td>Readback of pixels from the display screen
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* <td>Interfaces such as the java.awt.Composite interface or the
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* java.awt.Robot class allow arbitrary code to examine pixels on the
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* display enable malicious code to snoop on the activities of the user.
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* <tr>
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* <th scope="row">replaceKeyboardFocusManager
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* <td>Sets the {@code KeyboardFocusManager} for a particular thread.
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* <td>When {@code SecurityManager} is installed, the invoking thread must
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* be granted this permission in order to replace the current
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* {@code KeyboardFocusManager}. If permission is not granted, a
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* {@code SecurityException} will be thrown.
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* <tr>
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* <th scope="row">setAppletStub
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* <td>Setting the stub which implements Applet container services
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* <td>Malicious code could set an applet's stub and result in unexpected
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* behavior or denial of service to an applet.
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* <tr>
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* <th scope="row">setWindowAlwaysOnTop
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* <td>Setting always-on-top property of the window:
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* {@link Window#setAlwaysOnTop}
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* <td>The malicious window might make itself look and behave like a real
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* full desktop, so that information entered by the unsuspecting user is
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* captured and subsequently misused
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* <tr>
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* <th scope="row">showWindowWithoutWarningBanner
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* <td>Display of a window without also displaying a banner warning that the
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* window was created by an applet
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* <td>Without this warning, an applet may pop up windows without the user
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* knowing that they belong to an applet. Since users may make
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* security-sensitive decisions based on whether or not the window belongs
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* to an applet (entering a username and password into a dialog box, for
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* example), disabling this warning banner may allow applets to trick the
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* user into entering such information.
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* <tr>
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* <th scope="row">toolkitModality
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* <td>Creating {@link Dialog.ModalityType#TOOLKIT_MODAL TOOLKIT_MODAL}
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* dialogs and setting the
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* {@link Dialog.ModalExclusionType#TOOLKIT_EXCLUDE TOOLKIT_EXCLUDE} window
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* property.
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* <td>When a toolkit-modal dialog is shown from an applet, it blocks all
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* other applets in the browser. When launching applications from Java Web
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* Start, its windows (such as the security dialog) may also be blocked by
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* toolkit-modal dialogs, shown from these applications.
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* <tr>
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* <th scope="row">watchMousePointer
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* <td>Getting the information about the mouse pointer position at any time
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* <td>Constantly watching the mouse pointer, an applet can make guesses
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* about what the user is doing, i.e. moving the mouse to the lower left
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* corner of the screen most likely means that the user is about to launch
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* an application. If a virtual keypad is used so that keyboard is emulated
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* using the mouse, an applet may guess what is being typed.
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* </tbody>
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* </table>
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*
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@ -195,11 +167,9 @@ import java.security.BasicPermission;
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* @see java.security.PermissionCollection
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* @see java.lang.SecurityManager
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*
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*
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* @author Marianne Mueller
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* @author Roland Schemers
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*/
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public final class AWTPermission extends BasicPermission {
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/** use serialVersionUID from the Java 2 platform for interoperability */
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