This statement is misleading in that it says "key generation is
expensive". ECDHE key generation (over the elliptic curves that are
commonly used for TLS) is insanely fast compared to most other types
of key generation.
This statement is irrelevant for TLS 1.3, which requires (EC)DHE.
Even if this statement is somewhat true for TLS 1.2, it does not
justify discouraging the use of (EC)DHE.
PR-URL: https://github.com/nodejs/node/pull/41528
Reviewed-By: Rich Trott <rtrott@gmail.com>
Reviewed-By: Anna Henningsen <anna@addaleax.net>
Reviewed-By: Benjamin Gruenbaum <benjamingr@gmail.com>
This statement was objectively false. Clients usually only need to
generate and/or own a private key if the server sends a
CertificateRequest during the TLS handshake, which is not a common case.
PR-URL: https://github.com/nodejs/node/pull/41505
Reviewed-By: Filip Skokan <panva.ip@gmail.com>
Reviewed-By: Benjamin Gruenbaum <benjamingr@gmail.com>
Reviewed-By: Colin Ihrig <cjihrig@gmail.com>
Reviewed-By: Michael Dawson <midawson@redhat.com>
PR-URL: https://github.com/nodejs/node/pull/41477
Refs: https://github.com/nodejs/node/pull/24358
Reviewed-By: Colin Ihrig <cjihrig@gmail.com>
Reviewed-By: Richard Lau <rlau@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Tierney Cyren <hello@bnb.im>
Reviewed-By: Benjamin Gruenbaum <benjamingr@gmail.com>
Reviewed-By: Luigi Pinca <luigipinca@gmail.com>
This is a security release.
Notable changes:
Improper handling of URI Subject Alternative Names (Medium)(CVE-2021-44531)
- Accepting arbitrary Subject Alternative Name (SAN) types, unless a PKI
is specifically defined to use a particular SAN type, can result in
bypassing name-constrained intermediates. Node.js was accepting URI SAN
types, which PKIs are often not defined to use. Additionally, when a
protocol allows URI SANs, Node.js did not match the URI correctly.
- Versions of Node.js with the fix for this disable the URI SAN type when
checking a certificate against a hostname. This behavior can be
reverted through the `--security-revert` command-line option.
- More details will be available at
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-44531
Certificate Verification Bypass via String Injection (Medium)(CVE-2021-44532)
- Node.js converts SANs (Subject Alternative Names) to a string format.
It uses this string to check peer certificates against hostnames when
validating connections. The string format was subject to an injection
vulnerability when name constraints were used within a certificate
chain, allowing the bypass of these name constraints.
- Versions of Node.js with the fix for this escape SANs containing the
problematic characters in order to prevent the injection. This
behavior can be reverted through the `--security-revert` command-line
option.
- More details will be available at
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-44532
Incorrect handling of certificate subject and issuer fields (Medium)(CVE-2021-44533)
- Node.js did not handle multi-value Relative Distinguished Names
correctly. Attackers could craft certificate subjects containing a
single-value Relative Distinguished Name that would be interpreted as a
multi-value Relative Distinguished Name, for example, in order to inject
a Common Name that would allow bypassing the certificate subject
verification.
- Affected versions of Node.js do not accept multi-value Relative
Distinguished Names and are thus not vulnerable to such attacks
themselves. However, third-party code that uses node's ambiguous
presentation of certificate subjects may be vulnerable.
- More details will be available at
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-44533
Prototype pollution via `console.table` properties (Low)(CVE-2022-21824)
- Due to the formatting logic of the `console.table()` function it was
not safe to allow user controlled input to be passed to the `properties`
parameter while simultaneously passing a plain object with at least one
property as the first parameter, which could be `__proto__`. The
prototype pollution has very limited control, in that it only allows an
empty string to be assigned numerical keys of the object prototype.
- Versions of Node.js with the fix for this use a null protoype for the
object these properties are being assigned to.
- More details will be available at
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2022-21824
PR-URL: https://github.com/nodejs-private/node-private/pull/311
This is a security release.
Notable changes:
Improper handling of URI Subject Alternative Names (Medium)(CVE-2021-44531)
- Accepting arbitrary Subject Alternative Name (SAN) types, unless a PKI
is specifically defined to use a particular SAN type, can result in
bypassing name-constrained intermediates. Node.js was accepting URI SAN
types, which PKIs are often not defined to use. Additionally, when a
protocol allows URI SANs, Node.js did not match the URI correctly.
- Versions of Node.js with the fix for this disable the URI SAN type when
checking a certificate against a hostname. This behavior can be
reverted through the `--security-revert` command-line option.
- More details will be available at
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-44531
Certificate Verification Bypass via String Injection (Medium)(CVE-2021-44532)
- Node.js converts SANs (Subject Alternative Names) to a string format.
It uses this string to check peer certificates against hostnames when
validating connections. The string format was subject to an injection
vulnerability when name constraints were used within a certificate
chain, allowing the bypass of these name constraints.
- Versions of Node.js with the fix for this escape SANs containing the
problematic characters in order to prevent the injection. This
behavior can be reverted through the `--security-revert` command-line
option.
- More details will be available at
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-44532
Incorrect handling of certificate subject and issuer fields (Medium)(CVE-2021-44533)
- Node.js did not handle multi-value Relative Distinguished Names
correctly. Attackers could craft certificate subjects containing a
single-value Relative Distinguished Name that would be interpreted as a
multi-value Relative Distinguished Name, for example, in order to inject
a Common Name that would allow bypassing the certificate subject
verification.
- Affected versions of Node.js do not accept multi-value Relative
Distinguished Names and are thus not vulnerable to such attacks
themselves. However, third-party code that uses node's ambiguous
presentation of certificate subjects may be vulnerable.
- More details will be available at
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-44533
Prototype pollution via `console.table` properties (Low)(CVE-2022-21824)
- Due to the formatting logic of the `console.table()` function it was
not safe to allow user controlled input to be passed to the `properties`
parameter while simultaneously passing a plain object with at least one
property as the first parameter, which could be `__proto__`. The
prototype pollution has very limited control, in that it only allows an
empty string to be assigned numerical keys of the object prototype.
- Versions of Node.js with the fix for this use a null protoype for the
object these properties are being assigned to.
- More details will be available at
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2022-21824
PR-URL: https://github.com/nodejs-private/node-private/pull/312
This is a security release.
Notable changes:
Improper handling of URI Subject Alternative Names (Medium)(CVE-2021-44531)
- Accepting arbitrary Subject Alternative Name (SAN) types, unless a PKI
is specifically defined to use a particular SAN type, can result in
bypassing name-constrained intermediates. Node.js was accepting URI SAN
types, which PKIs are often not defined to use. Additionally, when a
protocol allows URI SANs, Node.js did not match the URI correctly.
- Versions of Node.js with the fix for this disable the URI SAN type when
checking a certificate against a hostname. This behavior can be
reverted through the `--security-revert` command-line option.
- More details will be available at
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-44531
Certificate Verification Bypass via String Injection (Medium)(CVE-2021-44532)
- Node.js converts SANs (Subject Alternative Names) to a string format.
It uses this string to check peer certificates against hostnames when
validating connections. The string format was subject to an injection
vulnerability when name constraints were used within a certificate
chain, allowing the bypass of these name constraints.
- Versions of Node.js with the fix for this escape SANs containing the
problematic characters in order to prevent the injection. This
behavior can be reverted through the `--security-revert` command-line
option.
- More details will be available at
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-44532
Incorrect handling of certificate subject and issuer fields (Medium)(CVE-2021-44533)
- Node.js did not handle multi-value Relative Distinguished Names
correctly. Attackers could craft certificate subjects containing a
single-value Relative Distinguished Name that would be interpreted as a
multi-value Relative Distinguished Name, for example, in order to inject
a Common Name that would allow bypassing the certificate subject
verification.
- Affected versions of Node.js do not accept multi-value Relative
Distinguished Names and are thus not vulnerable to such attacks
themselves. However, third-party code that uses node's ambiguous
presentation of certificate subjects may be vulnerable.
- More details will be available at
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-44533
Prototype pollution via `console.table` properties (Low)(CVE-2022-21824)
- Due to the formatting logic of the `console.table()` function it was
not safe to allow user controlled input to be passed to the `properties`
parameter while simultaneously passing a plain object with at least one
property as the first parameter, which could be `__proto__`. The
prototype pollution has very limited control, in that it only allows an
empty string to be assigned numerical keys of the object prototype.
- Versions of Node.js with the fix for this use a null protoype for the
object these properties are being assigned to.
- More details will be available at
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2022-21824
PR-URL: https://github.com/nodejs-private/node-private/pull/310
This is a security release.
Notable changes:
Improper handling of URI Subject Alternative Names (Medium)(CVE-2021-44531)
- Accepting arbitrary Subject Alternative Name (SAN) types, unless a PKI
is specifically defined to use a particular SAN type, can result in
bypassing name-constrained intermediates. Node.js was accepting URI SAN
types, which PKIs are often not defined to use. Additionally, when a
protocol allows URI SANs, Node.js did not match the URI correctly.
- Versions of Node.js with the fix for this disable the URI SAN type when
checking a certificate against a hostname. This behavior can be
reverted through the `--security-revert` command-line option.
- More details will be available at
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-44531
Certificate Verification Bypass via String Injection (Medium)(CVE-2021-44532)
- Node.js converts SANs (Subject Alternative Names) to a string format.
It uses this string to check peer certificates against hostnames when
validating connections. The string format was subject to an injection
vulnerability when name constraints were used within a certificate
chain, allowing the bypass of these name constraints.
- Versions of Node.js with the fix for this escape SANs containing the
problematic characters in order to prevent the injection. This
behavior can be reverted through the `--security-revert` command-line
option.
- More details will be available at
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-44532
Incorrect handling of certificate subject and issuer fields (Medium)(CVE-2021-44533)
- Node.js did not handle multi-value Relative Distinguished Names
correctly. Attackers could craft certificate subjects containing a
single-value Relative Distinguished Name that would be interpreted as a
multi-value Relative Distinguished Name, for example, in order to inject
a Common Name that would allow bypassing the certificate subject
verification.
- Affected versions of Node.js do not accept multi-value Relative
Distinguished Names and are thus not vulnerable to such attacks
themselves. However, third-party code that uses node's ambiguous
presentation of certificate subjects may be vulnerable.
- More details will be available at
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-44533
Prototype pollution via `console.table` properties (Low)(CVE-2022-21824)
- Due to the formatting logic of the `console.table()` function it was
not safe to allow user controlled input to be passed to the `properties`
parameter while simultaneously passing a plain object with at least one
property as the first parameter, which could be `__proto__`. The
prototype pollution has very limited control, in that it only allows an
empty string to be assigned numerical keys of the object prototype.
- Versions of Node.js with the fix for this use a null protoype for the
object these properties are being assigned to.
- More details will be available at
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2022-21824
PR-URL: https://github.com/nodejs-private/node-private/pull/309
Previously, Node.js incorrectly accepted uniformResourceIdentifier (URI)
subject alternative names in checkServerIdentity regardless of the
application protocol. This was incorrect even in the most common cases.
For example, RFC 2818 specifies (and RFC 6125 confirms) that HTTP over
TLS only uses dNSName and iPAddress subject alternative names, but not
uniformResourceIdentifier subject alternative names.
Additionally, name constrained certificate authorities might not be
constrained to specific URIs, allowing them to issue certificates for
URIs that specify hosts that they would not be allowed to issue dNSName
certificates for.
Even for application protocols that make use of URI subject alternative
names (such as SIP, see RFC 5922), Node.js did not implement the
required checks correctly, for example, because checkServerIdentity
ignores the URI scheme.
As a side effect, this also fixes an edge case. When a hostname is not
an IP address and no dNSName subject alternative name exists, the
subject's Common Name should be considered even when an iPAddress
subject alternative name exists.
It remains possible for users to pass a custom checkServerIdentity
function to the TLS implementation in order to implement custom identity
verification logic.
This addresses CVE-2021-44531.
CVE-ID: CVE-2021-44531
PR-URL: https://github.com/nodejs-private/node-private/pull/300
Reviewed-By: Michael Dawson <midawson@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Rich Trott <rtrott@gmail.com>
These changes are in preparation for enabling a JSDoc lint rule.
PR-URL: https://github.com/nodejs/node/pull/41109
Reviewed-By: Antoine du Hamel <duhamelantoine1995@gmail.com>
Reviewed-By: Michaël Zasso <targos@protonmail.com>
Reviewed-By: Ruben Bridgewater <ruben@bridgewater.de>
Reviewed-By: Luigi Pinca <luigipinca@gmail.com>
PR-URL: https://github.com/nodejs/node/pull/40959
Reviewed-By: Antoine du Hamel <duhamelantoine1995@gmail.com>
Reviewed-By: Rich Trott <rtrott@gmail.com>
Reviewed-By: Luigi Pinca <luigipinca@gmail.com>
Reviewed-By: James M Snell <jasnell@gmail.com>
PR-URL: https://github.com/nodejs/node/pull/39809
Reviewed-By: Anna Henningsen <anna@addaleax.net>
Reviewed-By: Tobias Nießen <tniessen@tnie.de>
Reviewed-By: Filip Skokan <panva.ip@gmail.com>
Reviewed-By: James M Snell <jasnell@gmail.com>
Update mdast-util-to-markdown to 1.2.4 which reduces unnecessary
escaping of `_` and some other characters. Re-run markdown formatter.
PR-URL: https://github.com/nodejs/node/pull/40645
Reviewed-By: Antoine du Hamel <duhamelantoine1995@gmail.com>
Reviewed-By: Michaël Zasso <targos@protonmail.com>
PR-URL: https://github.com/nodejs/node/pull/40403
Reviewed-By: Benjamin Gruenbaum <benjamingr@gmail.com>
Reviewed-By: Zijian Liu <lxxyxzj@gmail.com>
Reviewed-By: Michaël Zasso <targos@protonmail.com>
Reviewed-By: Antoine du Hamel <duhamelantoine1995@gmail.com>
Main changes:
- Replace current HTML anchor generation to match
header anchor generation in Github markdown.
- Remove unnecessary double namespacing on generated anchors/links (E.G.
`esm.md#loaders` instead of `esm.md#esm_loaders`).
- Anchors/links are automatically prefixed with their respective modules
when concatenated for usage in `all.html`.
Benefits:
- All anchor links within and between markdown API docs actually work.
- Adding new anchor links no longer requires contributors to generate
the HTML docs first to look up the correct anchors.
- Anchors are much shorter.
- All previous anchor links are preserved by generating hidden legacy
anchors.
PR-URL: https://github.com/nodejs/node/pull/39304
Reviewed-By: Antoine du Hamel <duhamelantoine1995@gmail.com>
Minor changes mostly to improve compliance with our style guide.
PR-URL: https://github.com/nodejs/node/pull/38202
Reviewed-By: Benjamin Gruenbaum <benjamingr@gmail.com>
Reviewed-By: James M Snell <jasnell@gmail.com>
Reviewed-By: Luigi Pinca <luigipinca@gmail.com>
Our docs use both _pseudo-random_ and _pseudorandom_. Standardize on
_pseudorandom_.
PR-URL: https://github.com/nodejs/node/pull/38196
Reviewed-By: Michaël Zasso <targos@protonmail.com>
Reviewed-By: Colin Ihrig <cjihrig@gmail.com>
Reviewed-By: Darshan Sen <raisinten@gmail.com>
Reviewed-By: James M Snell <jasnell@gmail.com>
Reviewed-By: Luigi Pinca <luigipinca@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: James M Snell <jasnell@gmail.com>
PR-URL: https://github.com/nodejs/node/pull/37070
Reviewed-By: Tobias Nießen <tniessen@tnie.de>
Reviewed-By: Filip Skokan <panva.ip@gmail.com>
remark-parse@9.0.0 combined with our html.js tool ends a list if a
multi-line item does not include indentation. Update our docs for this
formatting.
I looked around for a lint rule to enforce this but didn't find one
readily available. (Happy to be shown that I'm wrong about that!) We may
need to write one.
PR-URL: https://github.com/nodejs/node/pull/36049
Reviewed-By: Antoine du Hamel <duhamelantoine1995@gmail.com>
Reviewed-By: Daijiro Wachi <daijiro.wachi@gmail.com>
This helps catch broken links as part of the test suite. This also
improves the user experience when browsing the markdown files.
PR-URL: https://github.com/nodejs/node/pull/35191
Fixes: https://github.com/nodejs/node/issues/35189
Reviewed-By: Derek Lewis <DerekNonGeneric@inf.is>
Reviewed-By: Jiawen Geng <technicalcute@gmail.com>
Reviewed-By: Trivikram Kamat <trivikr.dev@gmail.com>
Reviewed-By: Richard Lau <riclau@uk.ibm.com>
Reviewed-By: Rich Trott <rtrott@gmail.com>
Docs switch between "command line" and "command-line" with no apparent
uniformity. Microsoft Style Guide prescribes "command line" as a noun
and "command-line" as a modifier, which makes a lot of sense to me.
Updating docs as appropriate.
PR-URL: https://github.com/nodejs/node/pull/35198
Reviewed-By: Anna Henningsen <anna@addaleax.net>
Reviewed-By: Daijiro Wachi <daijiro.wachi@gmail.com>
Reviewed-By: Tobias Nießen <tniessen@tnie.de>
Reviewed-By: Luigi Pinca <luigipinca@gmail.com>
Reviewed-By: Trivikram Kamat <trivikr.dev@gmail.com>
In one context, `<Buffer>` was being interpretted as an HTML tag and not
displayed.
PR-URL: https://github.com/nodejs/node/pull/35032
Reviewed-By: Richard Lau <riclau@uk.ibm.com>
Reviewed-By: Anna Henningsen <anna@addaleax.net>
In other api docs, it seems that deprecated classes and methods are
listed along with others, and marked as deprecated. In tls docs,
deprecations were listed at the bottom of the document. This commit
reorders them to what seems to be the standard, and corrects some links
in doc/api/deprecations.md
PR-URL: https://github.com/nodejs/node/pull/34687
Reviewed-By: Rich Trott <rtrott@gmail.com>
Added options: `ticketKeys` and `sessionTimeout`, that are honored by
`createServer`, that calls `createSecureContext`.
This also introduces a minor code simplification.
PR-URL: https://github.com/nodejs/node/pull/33974
Fixes: https://github.com/nodejs/node/issues/20908
Reviewed-By: Alba Mendez <me@alba.sh>
Reviewed-By: Ujjwal Sharma <ryzokuken@disroot.org>
Clarify that the `ctx` argument of the `SNICallback` callback is
optional.
Fixes: https://github.com/nodejs/node/issues/34085
PR-URL: https://github.com/nodejs/node/pull/34097
Reviewed-By: Ujjwal Sharma <ryzokuken@disroot.org>
Reviewed-By: Tobias Nießen <tniessen@tnie.de>
Reviewed-By: Trivikram Kamat <trivikr.dev@gmail.com>
Reviewed-By: James M Snell <jasnell@gmail.com>
We mostly have a single space between the punctuation that ends a
sentence and the start of the next sentence. Change instances with two
spaces to one.
PR-URL: https://github.com/nodejs/node/pull/33995
Reviewed-By: Matheus Marchini <mat@mmarchini.me>
Reviewed-By: James M Snell <jasnell@gmail.com>
Reviewed-By: Trivikram Kamat <trivikr.dev@gmail.com>
Add a note warning users that when using tls.connect(),
the `servername` option must be set explicitely to enable
SNI, otherwise the connection could fail.
PR-URL: https://github.com/nodejs/node/pull/33855
Fixes: https://github.com/nodejs/node/issues/28167
Co-authored-by: Denys Otrishko <shishugi@gmail.com>
Reviewed-By: Robert Nagy <ronagy@icloud.com>
Reviewed-By: Denys Otrishko <shishugi@gmail.com>
Reviewed-By: James M Snell <jasnell@gmail.com>
Reviewed-By: Tobias Nießen <tniessen@tnie.de>
Currently, running the example code will produce the following error in
bash:
$ node --tls-cipher-list="ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:!RC4" server.js
bash: !RC4: event not found
This commit changes the two examples to use single quotes to avoid the
shell from trying to interpret '!' as the history command.
PR-URL: https://github.com/nodejs/node/pull/33709
Reviewed-By: Richard Lau <riclau@uk.ibm.com>
Reviewed-By: Colin Ihrig <cjihrig@gmail.com>
Reviewed-By: James M Snell <jasnell@gmail.com>
Reviewed-By: Luigi Pinca <luigipinca@gmail.com>
This commit adds a configuration option named
openssl-default-cipher-list which takes a colon separated string
specifying ciphers that should be used as the default ciphers instead of
the ones defined in node_constants.
The motivation for this is a use case where Fedora/RHEL would like
to be able to specify a default cipher in the format PROFILE=SYSTEM.
This would enable Fedora/RHEL to have a system wide security level for
all applications.
PR-URL: https://github.com/nodejs/node/pull/33708
Refs: https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/packaging-guidelines/CryptoPolicies/
Reviewed-By: David Carlier <devnexen@gmail.com>
Reviewed-By: Ben Noordhuis <info@bnoordhuis.nl>
Reviewed-By: James M Snell <jasnell@gmail.com>
Reviewed-By: Richard Lau <riclau@uk.ibm.com>
